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Does corporate political giving actually affect shareholder wealth? While firms value political 
participation, some lawmakers oppose corporate involvement in politics. Yet, the existing 
literature has established a correlation between campaign finance and corporate outcomes 
without fully documenting a causal relation. I use an innovative database of political giving to 
exploit changes in state campaign finance laws as an exogenous shock to political giving. 
Specifically, I use the staggered adoption of externally imposed legal limits to political giving 
across U.S. states to expose how shareholder wealth responds. I find shareholder wealth declines 
following legally imposed reductions in political giving. The causal effect of political giving on 
shareholder wealth that I find speaks to the larger role of politics in firms and the economy. The 
results suggest corporate political giving leads to greater shareholder wealth, and reforms reduce 
corporate political participation, informing the debate around campaign finance reform. 
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Reform of the role of corporations in politics has been ongoing for a century, yet firms 
continue to participate in the political process, while the impact of reform on firms is unknown 
(Milyo 1999; Primo & Milyo 2006; Coates 2012). Some policymakers seek to limit corporations 
in politics to alleviate conflicts arising from special interest groups. Should firms participate in 
politics? Answering this requires understanding how political engagement affects firms. The 
literature linking corporations to politics suggests benefits arise from firms financially supporting 
policy makers, politicians guiding firm decision-making by serving on corporate boards and 
government leaders awarding valuable contracts to politically active firms (Faccio 2006; Faccio 
et al. 2006; Jayachandran 2006; Faccio & Parsley 2009; Goldman et al. 2009; Hill et al. 2013a). 
In particular, corporate financial support of politicians is positively correlated with stock 
performance, capital access and regulatory approval of acquisitions (Claessens et al. 2008; 
Cooper et al. 2010; Perez-Saiz & Semenov 2014).  
Since political participation is not randomly assigned but is instead a decision 
endogenous to the firm, one of the largest hurdles facing the literature of corporate participation 
in politics is identifying causality. Does political participation help firms succeed or, on the other 
hand, do successful firms have the resources and motivation to influence the political process? 
To examine the impact corporate political engagement has on shareholder wealth, I use a quasi-
natural experiment from externally imposed campaign finance reforms to attain causal inference 
and inform the ongoing debate over reform. 
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The staggered adoption of campaign finance reforms across U.S. states from 1988 to 
2010 results in time-varying state-level law changes requiring declines in campaign finance 
activity for some firms.
1
 Since campaign financing for state politicians is overseen by the state of 
the government office, I examine financing of state political campaigns by firms in states 
enacting campaign finance reforms (treatment) and compare them to otherwise similar firms in 
states without reforms (control). I use these events as an exogenous shock to examine the 
importance of political participation for firms. I utilize a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
approach analyzing the interaction of the post (relative to the pre) reform period and treatment 
(relative to control) firms. Consistent with the view that political involvement benefits firms, I 
observe a negative shock in shareholder wealth for treatment firms relative to control firms 
around reforms to political contribution limitations (i.e., to treatment firms in response to 
plausibly exogenous declines in political participation). 
My empirical approach necessitates a measure of political participation, so I define 
political giving as contributions made by political action committees dedicated to a firm, which 
are the mechanism firms use to finance politicians’ campaigns.
2
 I develop an innovative database 
of state political giving to identify firms forced to lower political giving and examine how 
shareholder wealth responds. The National Institute for Money in State Politics provides data on 
state campaign finance activity, which are critical to exploit state reforms. Campaign finance 
reforms typically impose new political giving limits, which offer plausibly exogenous declines in 
                                                 
 
1
 State campaign finance reforms have also been used as a quasi-natural experiment to test causal inferences in the 
public choice literature on election competition (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006). 
2
 Political action committees are the primary mechanism for firms to participate in campaign finance, since 
government regulators (e.g., Federal Election Commission) prohibit corporate treasuries from giving funds directly 
to political campaigns (Epstein 1980).  
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political giving. As a result, I study reforms establishing new legal limits to political giving that 
was previously unrestricted.  
To examine the impact of the reforms on firms and shareholders, I also require a measure 
of shareholder wealth, which I proxy for with firm value (Tobin’s Q) and stock performance (12-
Month Buy-and-Hold Return). I focus on performance during the four years following the 
reforms and compare it to the four years prior to reforms. I also analyze alternative measures 
with similar results. The economic magnitude of the results suggests the effect of limiting 
political giving is substantive, as shareholders of treatment firms exhibit an average decline in 
wealth of at least 5% following reforms.  
In additional analysis, I use a triple differences (difference-in-differences-in-differences, 
DiDiD) approach to compare firms concentrating political giving in the reform state. I analyze 
firms with political giving that is more concentrated and find treatment firms with concentrated 
political giving (i.e., a greater proportion of political giving limited by reforms) are adversely 
affected significantly more than other treatment firms are. Further, I explore channels where 
political giving could affect firms and find concentrated treatment firms are approximately 4% 
less likely to receive government contracts awarded by state governments following reforms, 
which is not trivial given the average subsidy value in my sample is $200 million. The results 
provide evidence political giving impacts shareholder wealth, in addition to offering a specific 
channel through which the firm is impacted. 
The DiD approach rules out many alternative hypotheses. For example, Cooper et al. 
(2010) state that “our finding of a link between contributions and future returns may simply be 
driven by unobserved firm characteristics that are correlated with contributions and are also the 
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main cause of increased returns.” My results show the decline in shareholder wealth relates only 
to treatment firms when political giving becomes restricted following reforms and are most 
pronounced for treatment firms with concentrated political giving. Therefore, general trends in 
shareholder wealth over time or effects related to firm characteristics are ruled out as alternative 
explanations. Further, greater declines at treatment firms with concentrated political giving 
within a state help alleviate concerns over differences between reform and non-reform states.  
One potential concern is the political economy where campaign finance reforms take 
place. Since the reforms take place across multiple years, plausible alternative explanations must 
relate to all campaign finance reforms over time. I have carefully reviewed reforms in addition to 
performing Weibull hazard models where the “failure events” are the adoption of laws restricting 
political giving to identify determinants. I find no evidence that events are endogenous to firms 
giving politically or those located in the state enacting reforms. Further, I find no evidence that 
current or prior economic and political characteristics are significant determinants of reforms as 
well as the primary cause of declines in shareholder wealth, government subsidy awards or 
political giving.  
I perform additional robustness tests using control firms within the states where reforms 
take place and find similar results. These tests mitigate concerns regarding differences in control 
firms that relate to the states where firms are headquartered beyond unobservable state fixed 
effects. Further, I control for unobservable characteristics related to states, industries and years 
by using fixed effects. I also measure value using industry adjusted Q and observe similar 
results. To summarize, the results are robust to using multiple measures of shareholder wealth 
and using different control samples to control for corporate, geographic and time-specific effects.  
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Overall, this study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. To my 
knowledge, it is the first analysis of corporate political activities at both state and federal levels 
of government. While existing studies primarily focus on federal political giving, the inclusion of 
corporate political giving to state campaigns allows me to exploit state law changes to infer 
causality between political giving and shareholder wealth. I document that a greater number of 
firms give to state politicians than to federal politicians. Moreover, many of the potential benefits 
from government ties are likely to occur at the state more so than at the federal level.
3
 Further, 
this study provides evidence that one channel through which firms benefit from greater political 
giving is larger government subsidy awards. In addition, this study extends the literature on 
shock-based causal inference in financial economics by using campaign finance reform to show 
reforms can lead to changes in wealth for affected firms compared to otherwise similar firms 
(Atanasov & Black 2014).  
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. Chapter two discusses the background and 
academic literature regarding campaign finance reform and corporate political giving. Chapter 
three describes the empirical methodology and results before chapter four concludes. 
                                                 
 
3
 See e.g., the 76th Oregon Legislative Assembly’s House Bill 4200 by Joint Special Committee on Economic 
Development from the one-day special session in December 2012 which provided future financial security, 




CHAPTER TWO  
 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
While corporations participate in the political process in many ways, I focus on political 
giving to campaigns, since this direct access to politicians develops reputational capital for the 
firm to benefit (Claessens et al. 2008; Cooper et al. 2010; Perez-Saiz & Semenov 2014; Brown 
et al. 2015). The Federal Election Commission (FEC) and state governments restrict campaign 
finance through extensive procedures politicians must follow, including disclosure of the source 
and use of funds. To allow equal access to participants, campaign finance is highly regulated and 
often includes strict limits. Importantly, corporations are prohibited from giving directly to 
political campaigns from the corporate treasury (Epstein 1980). However, corporations are 
allowed to support campaigns through political action committees (PACs) dedicated to the firm, 
giving from funds separate from the corporate treasury.  
Campaign Finance Background 
Prior to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, politically active corporations 
encouraged individuals to donate. However, the regulatory process led to the rise in corporate 
participation by offering an alternative mechanism for individuals to allocate more capital 
(Masters & Keim 1985; Conway 1986; Humphries 1991). Since firms are strictly prohibited 
from allocating corporate funds to political campaigns, firms instead administer PACs to finance 
political campaigns with “hard” money political giving from corporate PACs. Corporate PACs 
are firm-specific pools of money dedicated to the firm, associated with the firm stakeholders and 
stockholders but independent from the corporate treasury. While individual state law varies, most 
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follow the federal model.
4
 In fact, 11 CFR 102.5(a)(1)(ii) allows federal and state political giving 
to be made from the same corporate PAC. The FEC regulates all “hard” money, which includes 
all activities and funds directly financing political campaigns and committees. Alternatively, the 
FEC defines “soft” money as “money raised outside the limits and prohibitions of federal 
campaign finance law.” Soft money political giving includes outside expenditures indirectly 
related to politicians. While other mechanisms like soft money allow firms to participate in the 
political process, none allow firms direct access to politicians. Further, the literatures on 
corporate lobbying and soft money campaign finance activities document that executives benefit 
in the form of additional compensation and firms have agency and free cash flow problems 
(Aggarwal et al. 2012; Skaife et al. 2013).  
One example of alternative channels for corporations to participate in politics includes 
independent spending. Independent expenditure-only committees (i.e., “Super PACs”) cannot 
give to campaigns but instead seek to participate in the political process independently from 
political campaigns. Importantly, firm specific Super PACs do not exist in the manner that firm-
specific PACs do, allowing minimal interaction between firms and politicians through 
independent spending. Instead, many firms, individuals and organizations all give to the same 
Super PAC. Further, soft money giving is not campaign-specific, indicating that the spending is 
not directly linked to any particular political campaigns. The FEC clearly states, “Independent 
                                                 
 
4
 The most common legal structure among states follows federal precedent of separate funds, while other states 
regulate corporations similar to the FEC with similar political giving restrictions. Though some states allow firms to 
give to political campaigns without organizing a separately segregated fund, much of the regulatory process is 
similar for firms in these states as well. See e.g. National Conference of State Legislatures’ (NCSL) State Campaign 
Finance Laws: An Overview: http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-finance-an-
overview.aspx. 




expenditures represent spending by individuals, groups, political committees, corporations or 
unions expressly advocating the election or defeat of clearly identified federal campaigns. These 
expenditures may not be made in concert or cooperation with, or at the request or suggestion of, 
a candidate, the candidate's campaign or a political party.” 
5
 These restrictions limit direct 
connections between firms and politicians. 
Furthermore, Super PACs are not a prominent financing source of capital for the political 
channels in my study for several reasons. First, while most state campaign finance activity and 
laws are similar to those at the federal level, independent expenditures are highly concentrated at 
the federal level, while state and local elections are financed primarily through campaign 
expenditures (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006). Additionally, independent expenditures are 
largely funded by individuals rather than corporations (Ansolabehere et al. 2003; Briffault 2012; 
Bonica 2014). In fact, Cooper et al. (2010) document that soft money political giving and 
charitable giving do not influence the relation they observe between shareholder wealth and 
political giving, though it suffers from endogeneity.  
Further, Super PACs were expressly prohibited beginning with the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, until the 2010 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the case between Citizens United and the FEC.
6
 Moreover, prior to 2002, independent 
                                                 
 
5
 See e.g., FEC “Independent Expenditure-Only Committees” press release detailing independent expenditure-only 
committees: http://www.fec.gov/press/press2011/ieoc_alpha.shtml. Additionally, see e.g., the FEC’s “Super PACs 
and Other Independent Expenditure Filers,” which includes detailed descriptions of independent organizations 
participating in the political process: http://www.fec.gov/portal/super_pacs.shtml. 
6
 See McCain–Feingold Act, Pub.L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81, enacted March 27, 2002, H.R. 2356. Also, see e.g., 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Unfortunately, my primary research design 
does not benefit from this brief sub period because campaign finance reform halted while the legal process unfolded 
for BCRA. However, I do perform my analysis on the period prior to 2010 with qualitatively and quantitatively 
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expenditures were far more limited. In fact, during 2012, independent expenditures were more 
substantive than the two decades preceding, reaching $1 billion, while independent expenditures 
were only $11 million and $34 million, respectively during 1992 and 2000.
7
 Therefore, 
independent expenditures are of little importance prior to 2010. Overall, strict restrictions 
minimize alternative, unregulated channels linking corporations and politicians such that the 
primary mechanism connecting corporations to political campaigns is the corporate PAC. 
Corporate Political Action Committees 
The sole direct mechanism the FEC allows for corporate participation in campaign 
finance is the corporate PAC. Corporate PACs are separate segregated funds (SSFs). That is, 
PACs are dedicated to and administered by the firm, but PAC funds are separate from corporate 
resources. In particular, corporations can create and facilitate political giving to campaigns, so 
long as the corporate treasury does not fund any political giving (Milyo 1999). Individuals have 
the opportunity to give both directly to campaigns and to PACs, which in turn give to campaigns. 
By giving to PACs, individuals are more fully participating in the process through additional 
eligible channels. Corporate leadership and political advisors administer PACs and determine 
where to allocate capital. PACs rely on stakeholders and stockholders for funding, namely 
executives and upper-level management. Corporate treasuries may only provide administrative 
fees organizing the PAC. Further, corporate PACs cannot incentivize donations but can develop 
materials illustrating the goals and purpose of the PAC. For example, Microsoft sponsors the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
similar results. Similarly, correlations between political giving and firm value persist from 2002 to 2010, though the 
research design suffers from endogeneity. 
7
 See e.g., the Center for Responsive Politics “Outside Spending,” which documents the various forms of political 
spending outside of PACs: https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php?type=Y. 
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Microsoft Political Action Committee (MSPAC), which has a website stating, “Corporate 
participation in the public policy process is an important and essential means of enhancing 
shareholder value and is fundamental to free and democratic societies.” While employees fund 
corporate PACs, the political giving is still allocated based upon corporate decisions. In many 




While the literature on corporations involved in politics is vast, several studies argue that 
firms benefit from participating, even though endogeneity issues prevent them from establishing 
causation due to reverse causality, simultaneity bias, omitted variables and other specification 
errors. Similarly, the literature specifically focused on corporate political giving directly from 
PACs to political campaigns shows correlations with corporate outcomes but also suffers from 
endogeneity. Cooper et al. (2010) show that federal political giving is positively associated with 
both changes in shareholder wealth and certain firm characteristics, including size, profitability, 
market share and union membership, in addition to industry characteristics. Though they account 
for the likelihood of giving politically based on firm characteristics, the results incorporate the 
                                                 
 
8
 See e.g., NCSL “Political Action Committee Contribution Limits,” which states the following: “If a corporation 
desired to form a PAC, pooling contributions from its employees or outside sources into a distinct bank account, the 
PAC can spend money to influence elections in a way the corporation cannot by itself.”  
Also, see e.g., Microsoft’s Political Engagement website, which offers an overview: “Microsoft sponsors 
the Microsoft Political Action Committee (MSPAC), to enable Microsoft employees and shareholders to participate 
more effectively in the U.S. political process. The committee, created in 1988, informs its members about important 
issues and government decisions that can affect Microsoft business. It also provides an opportunity for members to 
collectively support public policy positions that are important to Microsoft and the software industry. As a bipartisan 
organization that contributes to the campaigns of federal, state, and local candidates, MSPAC typically supports 
candidates who share Microsoft views on public policy, serve as congressional or legislative leaders, represent 
districts or states where Microsoft has a major business presence, or serve on committees that have jurisdiction over 
legislation that is important to the company. 
“The MSPAC Steering Committee evaluates candidates' public policy positions on issues that are relevant 
to Microsoft business or of particular interest to the computer software industry. The committee – composed of 
senior managers in Legal and Corporate Affairs at Microsoft – then decides which candidates and campaigns 
MSPAC will support.” 
 
11 
endogenous decision to give a particular amount in addition to the effect of the political giving. 
They also find that neither non-campaign-specific soft money political giving through 
independent expenditure committees nor charitable giving drives these results.  
Additionally, Claessens et al. (2008) study Brazilian firms and find that political giving is 
associated with more access to financing. They attempt to alleviate endogeneity concerns by 
showing that political giving to presidential affiliates, incumbent and winning candidates have a 
greater impact. Unfortunately, the significant positive correlation between winning and losing 
candidates limits inferences. Likewise, Perez-Saiz and Semenov (2014) find that banks allocate 
capital to legislators who appoint regulators in advance of acquisitions, suggesting firms give to 
politically powerful legislators in advance of making acquisitions or that government officials 
allow firms giving politically to grow through the acquisition market. More recently, Brown et 
al. (2015) observe significantly lower and less volatile effective tax rates for firms giving 
politically, another example of opportunities for firms and shareholders to benefit from political 
engagement. However, in each case, similar endogeneity concerns persist. Overall, research on 
political giving observes positive correlations between firm benefits and political giving, similar 
to other literatures linking politics to corporate outcomes (Faccio 2006; Faccio et al. 2006; 
Faccio & Parsley 2009; Ovtchinnikov & Pantaleoni 2012; Yu & Yu 2012; Fang & Prabhat 2013; 
Hill et al. 2013a; Hill et al. 2013b; Chen et al. 2014). More importantly, the literature continues 
to struggle to resolve endogeneity concerns related to omitted variables and specification errors.  
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While the evidence associating positive corporate outcomes with larger political giving 
demonstrates a correlation, the causality of the relation is still unknown. Though researchers 
make efforts to account for endogeneity concerns, much of the evidence in the literature 
incorporates the effect of political giving on shareholder wealth as well as the endogenous 
factors correlated with the firm’s decision to allocate that amount of capital to politicians. Using 
time-varying political giving around campaign finance reform to exploit exogenous variation in 
giving reduces the possibility that omitted variables are correlated with the variables of interest. 
While federal campaign finance laws governing corporate political activity have changed very 
little through time with the exception of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), state 
campaign finance laws exhibit substantive variation across both states and time. Thus, the 
changes in state-level restrictions implemented over the past few decades allow for a quasi-
natural experiment on the importance of corporate involvement in the political process  and, thus, 
can offer insight into the effects of campaign finance (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006). I 
therefore exploit changes in state campaign finance reforms to identify the relation between 
corporate political giving and shareholder wealth. First, I summarize the data and show the 
correlation from prior literature. Then, I use a DiD approach to test whether campaign finance 
reforms affect corporate political giving and measure whether shareholder wealth responds to 
these externally imposed restrictions.  
 
13 
Corporate Political Giving and Firm Characteristics 
To take advantage of state campaign finance reform, I employ the most comprehensive 
database of hard money corporate PAC giving to political campaigns for government offices at 
all levels to test the effect on shareholder wealth. To my knowledge, this study is the first to 
study hard money gifts to politicians running for all government offices from firms in the 
CRSP/Compustat universe using data from the National Institute on Money in State Politics and 
the FEC.
9
 The FEC provides data for political giving to campaigns for federal offices beginning 
in 1979, and the first available state political giving data are in 1975. In order to reduce effects 
attributable to the cyclical nature of elections and political giving, I compute the total from data 
over a full four-year election cycle such that giving to a politician elected every four years are 
incorporated throughout the term length, similar to Cooper et al. (2010).
10
 The sample begins in 
1984, when the first full cycle of data are available, and ends in 2014, when the most recent 
election cycle ends. This period allows me to observe shareholder wealth for the four years 
before and after each reform, which span from 1988 to 2010.  
In order to exploit the adoption of these state laws and test causality, I include state 
political giving data, which are essential to capture the variation in giving largely free of 
econometric concerns related to reverse causality, simultaneity bias, omitted variables and other 
specification errors. In order to identify firms giving to state politicians, I collect PAC data from 
the National Institute on Money in State Politics, in addition to the FEC. Since firms giving 
                                                 
 
9
 Perez-Saiz and Semenov (2014) focus on state political giving and limit analysis to the importance of giving by 
financial institutions to state officials governing the financial services industry in advance of mergers and 
acquisitions. The remaining literature focuses on federal political giving. 
10
 My results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar when using the same five-year period as Cooper et al. 
(2010), as well as shorter and longer time periods. 
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politically decide how much to allocate to campaigns and frequently give the amount allowed by 
limits (and larger quantities when political giving is not restricted), restrictions on campaign 
finance implement binding constraints for some firms, resulting in exogenous variation in 
political giving for these firms.  
I define state political giving as contributions made by firm-dedicated PACs to political 
campaigns governed by state agencies, including candidates running for both state and local 
offices, while federal political giving include all contributions governed by and disclosed to the 
FEC. I manually identify firms with dedicated PACs from each source. I merge the political 
giving data with the CRSP/Compustat universe. All of the analysis is completed at the firm-year 
observation level. I perform two sets of analyses that require multiple samples. First, I replicate 
the prior literature using the full CRSP/Compustat universe (full sample). The other sample 
(experiment sample) is used for the quasi-natural experiment created by campaign finance 
reforms and consists of treatment firms and matching control firms. I identify treatment firms as 
those headquartered in states passing campaign finance reforms imposing limits below the firm’s 
previous political giving. Specifically, since each reform limits giving on a per campaign basis, I 
identify treatment firms using the maximum amount allocated to any campaign during the four-
year election cycle prior to reforms.  
The full sample is comprised of both firms that give to political candidate campaigns and 
firms that do not. Once I merge political giving data with financial and governance information, 
the final sample of all firms results in 95,878 firm-year observations pertaining to 31 years of 
data for 13,229 unique firms. Firms that do not give politically are separated from those that do 
give, and firms giving politically are further divided into three mutually exclusive categories: 
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firms giving to only state politicians, firms giving to state and federal politicians and firms giving 
to only federal politicians.
11
 Firms that give politically account for approximately 30% of the 
sample, with more firms giving to state campaigns than federal. Firms giving to both state and 
federal politicians allocate approximately 50% of total giving to state politicians. Table I presents 
firm characteristics for firms by political giving. Firms giving to state and federal politicians are 
the largest, followed by firms giving to only federal, only state and not at all. In addition to 
giving more politically, firms giving to state and federal politicians also have more geographic 
segments, higher leverage, higher governance index and larger, more independent boards. 
Comparing the groups reveals the distinctions and importance of the DiD and fixed effects in 
subsequent analyses.  
Despite campaign finance reform, the number of firms giving politically and the 
aggregate amounts given grow significantly from 1984 to 2014 in analyses results, especially for 
state political giving. While almost 20% of CRSP/Compustat firms gave politically in the 1980s 
(10% to federal and 10% to state politicians), nearly 30% gave politically in the 2000s (20% 
state and 10% federal). While campaign finance reform may have slowed the growth in political 
giving, state political giving and federal political giving have grown at average rates of 30% and 
12% during the past few decades. Taken together, these patterns indicate firm decision-makers 




                                                 
 
11
 The analysis is similar when groups are separated by firm-year, election cycle or the full period using the same 
categories, since political giving is persistent.  
12
 Most legislative activity takes place at the state level. In 2012, for example, the United States Congress passed 
fewer bills than any state legislature in the country, with most state legislature passing twice as many bills as 
Congress. See e.g., LegiNation, Inc., which provides data for state legislature activity: https://www.billtrack50.com/.  
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Table I – Summary of Political Giving  
In Table I, I present summary statistics for the CRSP-Compustat universe of firms from 1984 to 2014, grouped by 
political giving. Sample means for each group are presented with the number of unique firms and observation count 
listed above. Political giving is studied during four year cycles in order to reduce the cyclical nature of the data, 
similar to the methodology of Cooper et al. (2010). Political Giving is the sum of political giving by a given firm to 
all campaigns for any office during the prior four years ending with the election. Giving Per Campaign is the ratio of 
total political giving to the total number of campaigns to whom the firm gave politically during the prior four years 
ending with the election. Republican is the percentage of political giving allocated to Republican campaigns during 
the prior four years ending with the election. Incumbent is the percentage of political giving allocated to incumbent 
candidate campaigns during the election cycle. Headquarter State is the percentage of political giving allocated to 
campaigns in the firm’s headquartered state during the prior four years ending with the election. Market Value of 
Equity is total level of market capitalization of the firm in millions of USD at the most recent fiscal year end prior to 
the election cycle, using the price at the most recent month ending prior to the fiscal year end. Leverage is the ratio 
of long-term debt to assets at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle end. Geographic Segments is 
the count of geographic segments the firm has listed in Compustat during the most recent fiscal year end prior to the 
election cycle end. Regulated Industry is an indicator equal to one if a firm operates in the financial services industry 
(one-digit SIC code 6) or in the utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49) and zero otherwise. Prior 12-Month BHR 
is the cumulative return over the prior year immediately preceding the fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. 
All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. Differences compare the group to the left, with the first 
column comparing firms giving to state & federal campaigns to those giving to state campaigns. Significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated as *, ** and ***. 
 








 671 Firms 1,635 Firms 1,887 Firms 9,036 Firms 
 (N=4,142) (N=10,092) (N=11,648) (N=69,996) 
     
Political Giving Characteristics 
Political Giving 458,164*** 146,214*** 73,859*** 
 Giving Per Campaign 1,594* 1,245*** 1,653*** 
 Republican (%) 0.62*** 0.62 0.58*** 
 Incumbent (%) 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.64*** 
 Headquarter State (%) 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.55*** 
 
 
   
 Financial Characteristics 
Market Value of Equity 20,548*** 8,985*** 3,772*** 1,072*** 
Leverage 0.268* 0.257*** 0.267*** 0.210*** 
Geographic Segments 2.17*** 1.84*** 1.43*** 1.53*** 
Regulated Industries (%) 0.19* 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 
Prior 12-Month BHR 0.044*** 0.056* 0.098** 0.041*** 
Post 12-Month BHR 0.046* 0.043 0.064* 0.034** 
 
   
 Governance Characteristics 
Governance Index 9.87*** 9.88* 9.13*** 8.91** 
CEO Duality 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.61*** 0.54*** 
Board Size 11.16*** 10.69*** 9.99*** 8.75*** 
Independent (%) 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 
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As much of the prior literature has documented that federal political giving is correlated 
with firm value, I begin the analysis by regressing Tobin’s Q on measures of political giving and 
firm characteristics in Table II. Similar to Cooper et al. (2010), I also utilize the log of political 
giving measures. The positive coefficients for Log (Political Giving), Log (State Giving) and Log 
(Federal Giving) indicate all are positively correlated (coefficients = 0.012, 0.020 and 0.009, 
respectively) with Tobin’s Q, showing state political giving shares the positive correlation 
between federal political giving and firm value without controlling for endogeneity. State giving 
is also correlated with firm value beyond the correlation between state and federal giving by 
including both variables in column 4. Finally, column 5 shows state political giving is correlated 
with firm value even among federal givers. Panel B of Table II repeats the analysis including 
only firms giving politically, which shows a similar correlation. Though firm value is correlated 
with political giving, this analysis does not address endogeneity. As a result, I utilize the quasi-
natural experiment created from externally imposed campaign finance reforms to infer causality. 
Campaign Finance Reforms 
While many states follow the model of federal campaign finance laws, state campaign 
finance reform varies significantly from state to state between 1984 and 2014. Twenty-two states 
impose twenty-six campaign finance reforms. Seventeen of these law changes limit previously 
unlimited political giving, leading to plausibly exogenous declines in political giving. The 
remaining law changes relax restrictions, allowing firms to choose a higher level of political 
giving. Since political giving decisions become endogenous to the firm after restrictions are 
relaxed, I focus on law changes imposing limits that restrict firms’ political giving. These law   
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Table II – State and Federal Political Giving  
Table II tabulates the multivariate analysis of shareholder wealth for firms to analyze the relation to corporate 
political giving. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of 
equity from the most recent month ending prior to the fiscal year-end to total assets at the prior year-end following 
the end of the election cycle. Log (Political Giving) is the log of one plus the political giving to all campaigns during 
the election cycle. Log (State Giving) is the log of one plus the political giving to state campaigns during the election 
cycle. Log (Federal Giving) is the log of one plus the sum of political giving to federal campaigns during the 
election cycle. Log (State Giving) * Federal is the interaction of log of one plus the political giving to state 
campaigns during the election cycle with an indicator variable equal to one for firms giving to federal politicians and 
zero otherwise, such that the value is equal to the log of one plus state political giving for firms also giving to federal 
politicians and zero otherwise. Return-on-Assets is the ratio of net income to total assets at the most recent fiscal 
year end prior to the election cycle end. Log (Total Assets) is the total level of assets of the firm in millions of USD 
at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle. Intangible Ratio is the level of intangible assets scaled 
by total assets of the firm at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle. R&D-to-Sales is the total level 
of research and development expenses scaled by the total level of sales for the firm at the most recent fiscal year end 
prior to the election cycle. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to assets at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to 
the election cycle end. Inverse Mills Ratio is computed using a predicted model for the likelihood of giving 
politically from Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010). All models include firm and year fixed effects. All 
variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. Robust p-values are in parentheses, with standard errors clustered 
by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated as *, **, and ***. 
 
Panel A: Multivariate Analysis of State Political Giving and Firm Value 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
            
Log (Political Giving) 0.012***     
 
(0.002)     







Log (Federal Giving)   0.009** 0.005 0.003 
 
  (0.050) (0.337) (0.573) 







Log (Total Assets) -0.189*** -0.194*** -0.185*** -0.196*** -0.193*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Leverage -0.349*** -0.348*** -0.351*** -0.347*** -0.347*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Return-on-Assets -0.093 -0.089 -0.094 -0.089 -0.090 
 
(0.283) (0.302) (0.274) (0.304) (0.299) 
Intangible Ratio -0.470*** -0.476*** -0.472*** -0.477*** -0.480*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
R&D-to-Sales 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 2.842*** 2.879*** 2.827*** 2.882*** 2.872*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
 
    
 
 
    Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95,878 95,878 95,878 95,878 95,878 




Table II – State and Federal Political Giving (Continued)  
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis of State Political Giving and Firm Value among Firms Giving Politically 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
            
Log (Political Giving) 0.007*     
 
(0.053)     







Log (Federal Giving)   0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 
  (0.842) (0.670) (0.404) 







Inverse Mills Ratio 1.122*** 1.132*** 1.129*** 1.134*** 1.137*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.385*** -0.402*** -0.376*** -0.401*** -0.393*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Leverage -0.535*** -0.530*** -0.538*** -0.531*** -0.528*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Return-on-Assets 0.678*** 0.689*** 0.675*** 0.689*** 0.688*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Intangible Ratio -0.458*** -0.469*** -0.459*** -0.468*** -0.479*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
R&D-to-Sales 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.447) (0.427) (0.447) (0.426) (0.427) 
Constant 4.962*** 5.088*** 4.934*** 5.087*** 5.048*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
 
    Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,882 25,882 25,882 25,882 25,882 





changes take place between 1988 and 2010, with half of the reforms taking place by 1996, 
allowing time for exogenous variation in political giving following the law changes and 
subsequent changes in shareholder wealth. While laws are not randomly assigned, the impetus 
for each law differs. For example, some campaign finance reforms were enacted through voter 
initiatives in the 1990s (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006).
13
 Though unlikely that firms 
giving politically are the motivating factor in reforms, I address this concern later in additional 
analyses. The most commonly imposed corporate political giving limit is $5,000 from a firm to a 
political campaign during a four-year cycle. Though cost of living adjustments raise political 
giving, my analysis focuses on substantive law changes, imposing limits to previously 
unrestricted political giving. Limits influence the amounts firms give to politicians. Firms in 
states without political giving limits allocate over 100% more capital to politicians. Appendix 
A.I summarizes changes to political giving limit laws by state. 
Since firms allocate 55% of political giving to campaigns in the state where the firm is 
headquartered and politicians in the headquarter state are most likely to impact firms, I identify 
firms located in states where campaign finance reforms limit previously unrestricted political 
giving. While other firms are located in those states, I find 97 firms affected by the reforms such 
that they previously gave more to a single political campaign than the subsequently enacted 
reform allows. As a result, the reforms lead to plausibly exogenous declines in giving for these 
                                                 
 
13
 While California and Oregon also impose political giving limits in 1996, these law changes are not included in the 
analysis because they are overturned by judicial actions before an election cycle passes. These reforms do not alter 
my conclusions. Also, see e.g., Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006), who study the effects of changes in limits to 
political giving in elections and observe that winners have more competitive elections with smaller victory margins 
and more candidate campaigns once political giving limits take effect. They document that lower limits favor 
challengers, increasing competition. 
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97 treatment firms. I match treatment firms with firms from states that do not enact campaign 
finance reform such that my experiment sample includes treatment and control firms.  
To identify control firms, I draw from firms in non-reform states, excluding firms in 
states where political giving limits increase. I require that firms share the first digit of the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and year, in addition to being within 25% of 
Market Value of Equity, Tobin’s Q and Maximum Political Giving Per Headquarter State 
Campaign. Of the 97 treatment firms, 86 have at least one corresponding control firm that meets 
these requirements. Further, I require each firm’s match to have the necessary data to be included 
in the analysis, creating a balanced sample of treatment and control firms. Then, I select the 
control firm with total headquarter state political giving closest to the treatment firm to ensure 
that treatment and control firms have similar political giving and are matched on a one-to-one 
basis.
14
 Table III presents summary statistics comparing treatment and control firms. Treatment 
and control firms are characteristically indistinguishable during the year prior to reforms, 
including not having significantly different Market Value of Equity (p-value = 0.778), Leverage 
(0.528), Return-on-Assets (0.852), Governance Index (0.487), Business Segments (0.850), 
Geographic Segments (0.583), Industry Adjusted Q (0.964) and Prior 12-Month BHAR (0.203). 
This comparison suggests treatment and control assignment is “as-if” randomly assigned, 
facilitating an appropriate setting for a DiD testing approach. 
                                                 
 
14
 These binding constraints help identify a large sample of similar control firms. In fact, 75% of control firms are 
within 5% of the Market Value of Equity of the corresponding treatment firm. Further, 80% share the first two digits 
of the SIC code and 65% share the first three digits. I only require that the treatment and control firm be in the 
sample for one year before and after the reforms to be included in the sample, but of the four years before and after 
the reforms, each pair is included for an average of 7.4 of the 8 possible years.  
The results are similar when requiring firms be present for the full period, share the first three digits of the SIC code 
and be within 5% of Market Value of Equity, though the sample size reduction affects the power to test significance 
in some tests. I have also performed tests with larger samples including less restrictive matching constraints and 
unmatched pooled analyses with similar results. 
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Table III – Summary of Firm Characteristics and Political Giving  
Table III presents summary statistics for firms grouped by whether the firm is a treatment firm, giving above 
subsequently imposed political giving limits during the year prior to the reform in the firm’s headquarter state. The 
groups provide a quasi-natural experiment. Each group includes 86 matching firms, with sample means for each 
group in addition to the p-value for the test comparing the sample means. Matching firms are required to share the 
first digit of the Standard Industrial Classification code industry and be within 25% of Market Value of Equity, 
Tobin’s Q and Maximum Political Giving Per Campaign over the most recent four-year election cycle. Then, I select 
the firm closest in Total Headquarter State Political Giving, such that the match is one-to-one. Market Value of 
Equity is total level of market capitalization of the firm in millions of USD at the most recent fiscal year end prior to 
the election cycle, using the price at the most recent month ending prior to the fiscal year end. Leverage is the ratio 
of long-term debt to assets at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle end. Return-on-Assets is the 
ratio of net income to total assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. Intangible Assets 
is the level of intangible assets scaled by total assets of the firm at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the 
election cycle. Board Size is a count of the board of directors at the firm at the most recent annual meeting prior to 
the election cycle end. Insiders is the number of the board of directors employed by the firm at the most recent 
annual meeting prior to the election cycle end. Governance Index is a measure of firm governance based upon 
provisions the firm holds at the most recent annual meeting date prior to the election cycle end, reported by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), with higher numbers indicating less shareholder-friendly provisions in place or 
worse overall governance. Business Segments is the count of business segments the firm has listed in Compustat 
during the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. Geographic Segments is the count of 
geographic segments the firm has listed in Compustat during the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election 
cycle end. Industry Adjusted Q is the ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity at the 
month prior to the fiscal year end to total assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end, less 
the median for the industry as defined by the first two digits of Standard Industrial Classification Code. Prior 12-
Month BHAR is the cumulative return less the market return over the prior year immediately preceding the fiscal 
year end prior to the election cycle end. Prior 36-Month BHAR is the cumulative return less the market return over 
the prior three years immediately preceding the fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. All variable 
definitions are included in Appendix A.II.  
 
 
Treatment Control P-Value of Difference 
 
86 Firms 86 Firms 86 Firm-Pairs 
Market Value of Equity 6,994 7,919 0.778 
Leverage 0.27 0.29 0.528 
Return-on-Assets 0.01 0.02 0.852 
Intangible Ratio 0.18 0.16 0.367 
Board Size 10.00 9.42 0.204 
Board Insiders 1.37 1.36 0.971 
Governance Index 9.33 8.36 0.487 
Business Segments 2.52 2.62 0.850 
Geographic Segments 1.41 1.56 0.583 
Industry Adjusted Q 0.16 0.16 0.964 
Prior 12-Month BHAR 0.09 0.02 0.203 





To discern the impact of campaign finance reform on political giving and affirm that the 
constraint binds as expected, I analyze political giving before and after reforms for treatment and 
control firms. My univariate analysis serves as a traditional DiD approach. Specifically, since all 
reforms impose limits to political giving from each firm to each campaign, I focus on the 
maximum amount a firm gives any political campaign to identify when the new legally imposed 
constraint on political giving is binding.
15
 Table IV tabulates Maximum Political Giving Per 
Headquarter State Campaign in Panel A and Total Headquarter State Political Giving in Panel 
B for treatment and control firms (first difference) during the pre and post reform periods 
(second difference). I average observations during the four years (full election cycle) before and 
after the reforms, to alleviate potential econometric issues related to time dependence in the 
outcome variable within each firm (Bertrand et al. 2004). The results document a significant 
decline in Maximum Political Giving Per Headquarter State Campaign of approximately 65% 
for treatment firms following reforms, while control firms exhibit increases in political giving, 
similar to political giving trends for the broader sample period. The first and second differences 
suggest treatment firms exhibit similar political giving pre-reform but significantly lower 
political giving post reform. Moreover, the DiD p-value is below 1%. Similarly, Total 
Headquarter State Political Giving declines approximately 25% for treatment firms, while 
remaining unchanged for control firms. While the parallel changes assumption is not directly 
testable, my results in Table IV offer informal confirmation that the assumption is credible, 
showing treatment and control firms exhibit similarities and correlated political giving subject to   
                                                 
 
15
 Political giving is highly persistent over time, so prior giving proxies for future giving in the absence of reforms. 
The first-order autocorrelation coefficient is 0.938, which has an F-statistic of 5.620, rejecting the null hypothesis of 
no first-order autocorrelation.  
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Table IV – Political Giving around Campaign Finance Reforms  
Table IV summarizes political giving around campaign finance reforms for 86 treatment and control firms during 
the four-year election cycle before and after campaign finance reforms. Panel A shows maximum political giving 
allocated per campaign in the firm’s headquarter state, while Panel B shows total political giving in the firm’s 
headquarter state. Matching firms are required to share the first digit of the Standard Industrial Classification code 
industry and be within 25% of Market Value of Equity, Tobin’s Q and Maximum Political Giving Per Campaign 
over the most recent four-year election cycle. Then, I select the firm closest in Total Headquarter State Political 
Giving, such that the match is one-to-one. To alleviate concerns over cyclical effects in political giving, I use four-
year election cycle political giving measures. Maximum Political Giving Per Headquarter State Campaign is 
computed as the maximum of all political giving to each headquarter state campaign during the four-year election 
cycle before and after the law change. Total Headquarter State Political Giving is computed as the sum of all 
political giving to each headquarter state campaign during the four-year election cycle before and after the law 
change. All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are 
indicated as *, ** and ***.  
 
Panel A: Maximum Political Giving Per Headquarter State Campaign around Campaign Finance Reforms 
 
Pre Post Difference 
Treatment 15,477 5,427 (10,050)*** 
Control 14,346 15,474 1,128*** 
Difference 1,131 (10,047)*** (11,178)*** 
 
 
Panel B: Total Headquarter State Political Giving around Campaign Finance Reforms 
 
Pre Post Difference 
Treatment 47,780 35,359 (12,421)*** 
Control 40,680 41,020 340 





similar economic and legal forces.
16
 The decline in political giving for treatment firms following 
campaign finance reforms suggests the experimental setting is useful for understanding the 
impact on firms and shareholders when law changes externally impose shifts in political giving. 
Having demonstrated the importance of campaign finance reform on political giving, I study 
shareholder wealth around reforms to infer causality of political giving on corporate outcomes. 
Univariate Analysis of Shareholder Wealth around Campaign Finance Reforms 
My first attempt at identifying causal inference largely free of econometric concerns 
involves analyzing the univariate DiD between treatment and control firms between the pre and 
post reform periods. In Table V, I analyze firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q, in Panel A and 
stock performance, measured by 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return, in Panel B. The second 
difference in both analyses is negative and significant, indicating that treatment firms decline in 
value and shareholders lose wealth following reforms, relative to control firms. The economic 
magnitude suggests firm value declines by over 10%, while buy-and-hold returns decrease by 
16% in the post reform period relative to control firms. In both Panel A and B, the sign of the 
change from the pre to post reform period is positive for control firms and negative for treatment 
firms. Table V suggests that treatment firms decline in value relative to control firms, providing 
evidence that declines in political giving lead to lower shareholder wealth. 
As an additional test, I examine the differential impact of the reforms on treatment firms 
where law changes should have a larger effect, i.e., firms with more concentrated political 
giving. I implement a DiDiD framework by comparing concentrated treatment firms to  
                                                 
 
16
 Since multiple staggered shocks lead to concerns regarding parallel trends, I also employ an instrumental variable 
approach as robustness, which replaces the parallel trends assumption with the “only through” assumption. The 
results are similar, and conclusions unchanged. 
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Table V – Shareholder Wealth around Campaign Finance Reforms  
Table V summarizes firm value and stock performance around campaign finance reforms for 86 treatment and 
control firms during the four-year election cycle before and after campaign finance reforms. Matching firms are 
required to share the first digit of the Standard Industrial Classification code industry and be within 25% of Market 
Value of Equity, Tobin’s Q and Maximum Political Giving Per Campaign over the most recent four-year election 
cycle. Then, I select the firm closest in Total Headquarter State Political Giving, such that the match is one-to-one. 
Panels A and B present average firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q and 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return during 
the four-year election cycle before and after reforms. I present means for the four annual observations before and 
after each law change, in addition to the differences between groups, pre and post law changes for each group and 
the difference-in-differences. Tobin’s Q is computed as the ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market 
value of equity at the month prior to the fiscal year end to total assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the 
end of the election cycle, such that the average of the four years before and after the campaign finance reform are 
included. 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return is the cumulative return over the prior year immediately preceding the 
fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end such that the average of the four years before and after the campaign 
finance reform are included. All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels are indicated as *, ** and ***.  
 
Panel A: Firm Value Measured by Tobin’s Q around Campaign Finance Reform 
 
Pre Post Difference 
Treatment 1.61 1.52 (0.09) 
Control 1.58 1.69 0.11** 
Difference 0.03 (0.17) (0.20)* 
 
 
Panel B: Stock Performance Measured by Buy-and-Hold Return around Campaign Finance Reform 
 
Pre Post Difference 
Treatment 0.25 0.12 (0.13) 
Control 0.13 0.16 0.03 




diversified treatment firms. Specifically, I measure concentration in two manners: headquarter 
state concentration and campaign concentration. Since the reforms take place in the state where 
the firms are headquartered, law changes should have a disproportionately greater effect on firms 
allocating a larger percentage of political giving to the headquarter state. Further, since reforms 
limit giving on a per campaign basis, firms concentrating political giving among a smaller 
number of candidates should also exhibit larger declines in shareholder wealth following 
reforms, since the political giving structure of those firms becomes constrained to a greater 
degree. I measure headquarter state concentration as the ratio of the firm’s headquarter state 
political giving to giving in all state campaigns, which I analyze in Panels A (firm value) and C 
(stock performance). Similarly, in Panels B and D, I measure campaign concentration as the 
percentage of the firm’s top campaign gift relative to all campaigns. In each case, I bifurcate the 
sample on the median and compare above and below median concentration. Table VI presents 
the results. 
The DiDiD results are all negative with the economic magnitudes implying declines in 
shareholder wealth at least as large as those observed in Table V. Panels A and B reveal that 
firms with concentrated political giving in reform states exhibit relative declines compared to 
firms with more diversified political giving. Both the second and third differences are negative 
and statistically significant in each case. This decline suggests that firms more reliant upon the 
firm’s headquarter state exhibit the strongest reaction to law changes in that state, while other 
similar firms do not exhibit the same decline. Treatment firms with geographically diversified 
political giving outperform concentrated treatment firms in reform states during the post reform 
period. Panel C and D also shows a similar relation for firms with concentrated and diverse  
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Table VI – Concentrated Political Giving around Campaign Finance Reforms  
Table VI summarizes firm value and stock performance around campaign finance reforms for treatment and control 
firms grouped by concentration. Using the concentration of treatment firm political giving, I divide the sample in 
half to identify firms more vulnerable to reforms. I measure concentration with two measures: headquarter state and 
campaign concentration. Headquarter State Concentration is the ratio of political giving to campaigns in the firm’s 
headquarter state to political giving to all state campaigns. Campaign Concentration is the ratio of political giving to 
the campaign where the firm gives the most to the total political giving to all campaigns. Panels A and C use 
Headquarter State Concentration, while Panels B and D use Campaign Concentration. Panels A and B measure 
firm value using Tobin’s Q, while Panels C and D utilize Buy-and-Hold Return. Tobin’s Q is computed as the ratio 
of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity at the month prior to the fiscal year end to total 
assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the end of the election cycle, such that the average of the four years 
before and after the campaign finance reform are included. 12-Month BHR is the cumulative return over the prior 
year immediately preceding the fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end such that the average of the four years 
before and after the campaign finance reform are included. All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. I 
present means for the four annual observations before and after each law change, in addition to the differences 
between groups, pre and post law changes for each group and the difference-in-differences. Significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels are indicated as *, ** and ***.  
 
Panel A: Firm Value Measured by Tobin’s Q by Headquarter State Concentration 
 
Concentrated Diversified Difference 
 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Difference 
Treatment 1.53 1.14 1.69 1.91 -0.16 -0.77* -0.61* 
Control 1.54 1.83 1.62 1.55 -0.08 0.28 0.36 
Difference -0.01 -0.70* 0.07 0.36 -0.08 -1.05*** -0.97*** 
 
 
       Panel B: Firm Value Measured by Tobin’s Q by Campaign Concentration 
 
Concentrated Diversified Difference 
 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Difference 
Treatment 2.06 1.54 1.16 1.51 0.90 0.03 -0.87** 
Control 1.05 1.23 2.11 2.15 -1.06 -0.92 0.14 
Difference 1.01** 0.31 -0.95** -0.65* 1.96*** 0.95** -1.01** 
 
 
       Panel C: Stock Performance Measured by Buy-and-Hold Return by Headquarter State Concentration 
 
Concentrated Diversified Difference 
 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Difference 
Treatment 0.34 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.17 0.15 -0.02 
Control 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.12 -0.04 0.08 0.12 
Difference 0.23* -0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.21* 0.07 -0.14* 
 
 
       Panel D: Stock Performance Measured by Buy-and-Hold Return by Campaign Concentration 
 
Concentrated Diversified Difference 
 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Difference 
Treatment 0.22 0.18 0.28 0.06 -0.06 0.12 0.18 
Control 0.10 0.29 0.17 0.04 -0.07 0.25 0.32* 
Difference 0.13 -0.11 0.12 0.03 0.01 -0.13 -0.14* 
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political giving among campaigns. These results also provide additional evidence that the 
differences observed around reforms relate specifically to changes in campaign finance activity. 
Having established evidence of a univariate relation between shareholder wealth and political 
giving reductions around reforms, I perform a multivariate DiD and DiDiD analysis of political 
giving shocks.  
Multivariate Analysis of Political Giving and Shareholder Wealth around Reforms 
I implement the DiD approach in a multivariate setting to control for additional firm 
characteristics and unobservable fixed effects. I regress shareholder wealth, measured by Tobin’s 
Q and BHAR12, on Treatment, Post, and Treatment * Post. Post is an indicator variable equal to 
one following campaign finance reform, and Treatment is an indicator variable equal to one for 
firms in states enacting reforms whose maximum political gift in the election cycle prior to the 
reform exceeded the reform limit. The primary variable of interest is Treatment * Post, which 
identifies the group of firms previously giving more politically than the newly imposed reform 
allows after the reform takes effect. Table VII presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 present 
results for Tobin’s Q, while columns 3 and 4 present results for BHAR12. Column 1 shows 
treatment and control firms do not have significantly different firm value overall, consistent with 
the value being similar prior to reforms. Column 2 shows that firm value is significantly lower 
for treatment firms following reforms (coefficient = -0.154; p-value = 0.096). Columns 3 and 4 
present similar results, with the coefficient of Treatment * Post also being negative (-0.085) and 
significant (0.066). The economic magnitudes suggest that shareholder wealth declines 
approximately 9% for each measure. The results support firms' claims that political giving leads 
to greater shareholder wealth. Shareholder wealth decreases after limiting reforms for firms that  
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Table VII – Shareholder Wealth and Political Giving around Campaign Finance Reforms  
Table VII analyzes shareholder wealth for treatment and control firms around campaign finance reforms. Treatment 
is an indicator variable equal to one for firms allocating at least the subsequently imposed political giving limit to 
any political campaign in the firm’s headquarter state during the election cycle prior to campaign finance reform and 
zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable equal to one following campaign finance reforms and zero otherwise. 
Treatment * Post is an indicator variable equal to one for treatment firms after campaign finance reforms and zero 
otherwise. Size is the log of the total market capitalization of the firm in millions of USD at the election cycle end. 
Book-to-Market is computed as the ratio of book value of equity at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the end of 
the election cycle to the market value of equity at the month prior to the fiscal year end prior to the end of the 
election cycle. Market is the cumulative return on the market over the prior year immediately preceding the fiscal 
year end prior to the election cycle end. Momentum is the cumulative return over the prior year immediately 
preceding the fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. All models include state, industry and year fixed effects. 
Industry definitions utilize two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code. All variable definitions are included in 
Appendix A.II. Robust p-values are presented in parentheses. Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
thresholds as ***, ** and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q BHAR12 BHAR12 
          
Treatment 0.0637 0.0244 0.0486 0.0248 
 











































  Size 
  
-0.027* -0.028* 















   
(0.875) (0.911) 
Constant 1.634*** 1.541*** 0.026* 0.028* 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.088) (0.080) 
     State, Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.082 0.086 0.028 0.021 
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previously allocated political giving above the subsequently imposed limit (i.e., firms legally 
forced to reduce political giving) but does not for otherwise similar control firms maintaining 
similar political giving.  
Next, I implement the DiDiD in a multivariate setting. I add two indicator variables to 
measure concentration: High Headquarter Concentration and High Campaign Concentration. 
The primary variables of interest are Treat * Post * High Headquarter and Treat * Post * High 
Campaign, respectively. Table VIII presents the results, which document that firms giving 
politically in a concentrated manner exhibit significantly lower shareholder wealth following 
reforms, relative to otherwise similar control firms and non-concentrated treatment firms. The 
economic magnitude of the results demonstrates that shareholders of concentrated treatment 
firms exhibit the largest decline in wealth. Each model has a significant (p-values = 0.003, 0.060, 
0.019, 0.028, respectively) and negative coefficient, with each model suggesting the decline 
exceeds 9%.  
Government Awarded Contractual Subsidies 
Finally, to provide insight into a potential channel through which political giving impacts 
shareholder wealth, I analyze subsidy contracts awarded to firms by state governments. One of 
the primary manners in which the literature discusses firm benefits from involvement with the 
political process is through preferential treatment by government decision-makers (Faccio et al. 
2006; Claessens et al. 2008; Yu & Yu 2012; Chen et al. 2014). The most direct manner in which 
a government transfers capital to a corporation is through large government contract awards. If 
government contracts are valuable, then firms giving politically could increase shareholder 
wealth by obtaining additional contracts that offer supplementary revenue and profit.  
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Table VIII – Concentrated Giving and Shareholder Wealth around Reforms  
Table VIII summarizes shareholder wealth around campaign finance reforms for firms by political giving 
concentration. Using the concentration of treatment firm political giving, I divide the sample in half to identify firms 
more vulnerable to reforms. I measure concentration with two measures: headquarter state and campaign 
concentration. High Headquarter Concentration is an indicator variable equal to one if the ratio of political giving to 
campaigns in the firm’s headquarter state to political giving to all state campaigns is above the sample median and 
zero otherwise. High Campaign Concentration is an indicator variable equal to one if the ratio of political giving to 
the campaign where the firm gives the most to the total political giving to all campaigns is above the sample median 
and zero otherwise. Control variables for columns 1 and 2 include Log (Total Assets), Return-on-Assets, Intangible 
Ratio, R&D-to-Sales, Business Segments and Geographic Segments, while control variables included in columns 3 
and 4 are Size, Book-to-Market, Market and Momentum. All models include state, industry and year fixed effects. 
Industry definitions utilize two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code. All variable definitions are included in 




Table VIII – Concentrated Giving and Shareholder Wealth around Reforms (Continued)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q BHAR12 BHAR12 
          
Treatment -0.645*** 0.541** 0.025 0.140* 
 
(<0.001) (0.017) (0.795) (0.078) 
Post -0.182** -0.011 0.081 0.043 
 
(0.038) (0.928) (0.323) (0.284) 
Treatment * Post 0.899** -0.050 0.017 0.139 
 
(0.035) (0.899) (0.887) (0.250) 

























 Post * High Headquarter  0.353*** 0.022 
 
(0.003)  (0.464)  
Treat * Post * High Headquarter  -0.682***  -0.0980** 
 
 
(0.003)  (0.019) 







Post * High Campaign  
 










































 -0.050* -0.035* 
  















 (0.115) (0.845) 
Constant 1.587*** 1.079*** 0.042* 0.033* 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.081) (0.080) 
    
State, Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272 




I analyze determinants of state government contract awards to study the relation to 
political giving. To examine government contracts, I collect data from Good Jobs First, a 
national policy resource center tracking the largest economic development subsidy packages 
awarded by state and local governments.
17
 While less than 1% of firms in the sample receive 
government subsidies, the average subsidy value in my sample is $200 million dollars, which is 
likely to be the most direct mechanism for governments to affect shareholder wealth. Table IX 
examines political giving to government subsidies for the full sample, while Table X implements 
the DiD approach for subsidies. Though the methodology suffers from endogeneity concerns, 
Table IX shows firms giving politically, especially those allocating more money to state 
politicians, also receive more frequent and larger state contracts. Column 1 documents that Log 
(State Giving) is positively (coefficient = 0.0003) and significantly (p-value < 0.001) related to 
the probability of being awarded a government subsidy. Column 2 shows a similar result using 
an indicator variable, State Political, equal to one if the firm gives to state politicians and zero 
otherwise. Firms giving politically are 25% more likely to be awarded government contracts if 
they give politically.
18
 Further, column 3 shows that firms giving more politically are also 
awarded larger contracts, while column 4 shows firms giving politically are awarded 2% larger 
contracts. Since these relations may suffer from endogeneity, I perform a DiD analysis with 
respect to subsidies. 
  
                                                 
 
17
 See e.g., Good Jobs First’s Subsidy Tracker: http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/megadeals/subsidy-tracker. 
18
 I compute the conditional change in the probability by dividing the relative increase in conditional probability by 
the overall probability of contract awards in the sample: ((coefficient of State Political) / (Probability of Subsidy 
Award)) = 0.001 / 0.004. 
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Table IX – Political Giving and Government Subsidies  
Table IX tabulates the multivariate analysis of state government subsidy awards and corporate political giving. Log 
(State Giving) is the log of one plus the political giving to state campaigns during the election cycle. State Political 
is indicator variable equal to one if the firm allocates capital to political giving to state campaigns during the election 
cycle and zero otherwise. Log (Subsidy) is the log of one plus the value of a subsidy value from a state or local 
government awarded to the firm during the following year. Subsidy is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
receives a subsidy from a state or local government the following year and zero otherwise. Return-on-Assets is the 
ratio of net income to total assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. Log (Total Assets) 
is the total level of assets of the firm in millions of USD at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle. 
Intangible Ratio is the level of intangible assets scaled by total assets of the firm at the most recent fiscal year end 
prior to the election cycle. R&D-to-Sales is the total level of research and development expenses scaled by the total 
level of sales for the firm at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle. Leverage is the ratio of long-
term debt to assets at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle end. All variable definitions are 
included in Appendix A.II. All models include state, industry and year fixed effects. Industry definitions utilize two-
digit Standard Industrial Classification code. Robust p-values are in parentheses, with standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated as *, **, and ***. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Subsidy Subsidy Log (Subsidy)  Log (Subsidy)  
          
Log (State Giving) 0.0003***  0.007*** 
 
 
(<0.001)  (<0.001) 







Log (Total Assets) 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Leverage -0.0009* -0.001* -0.018* -0.017* 
 
(0.084) (0.090) (0.070) (0.075) 
Return-on-Assets -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.018*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.00102) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Intangible Ratio -0.001* -0.001* -0.024* -0.024* 
 
(0.055) (0.056) (0.053) (0.054) 
R&D-to-Sales -126.5 -141.6 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 
(0.265) (0.266) (0.264) (0.265) 
Constant -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.037*** -0.045*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
  
  State, Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95,878 95,878 95,878 95,878 






Table X – Political Giving and Government Subsidies around Campaign Finance Reforms  
Table X tabulates the multivariate analysis of state government subsidy awards and corporate political giving around 
reforms. Log (Subsidy) is the log of one plus the value of a subsidy value from a state or local government awarded 
to the firm during the following year. Subsidy is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm receives a subsidy 
from a state or local government the following year and zero otherwise. Using the concentration of treatment firm 
political giving, I divide the sample in half to identify firms more vulnerable to reforms. I measure concentration 
with two measures: headquarter state and campaign concentration. All models include state, industry and year fixed 
effects. Industry definitions utilize two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code. All variable definitions are 
included in Appendix A.II. All models include state, industry and year fixed effects. Industry definitions utilize two-
digit Standard Industrial Classification code. Robust p-values are in parentheses, with standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated as *, **, and ***. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





(Subsidy)                
Treatment -0.004 -0.076 -0.011 -0.220 -0.035 -0.731 
 
(0.543) (0.508) (0.204) (0.199) (0.149) (0.126) 
Post -0.001 -0.023 -0.006 -0.113 -0.014 -0.299 
 
(0.721) (0.771) (0.210) (0.193) (0.188) (0.163) 
Treatment * Post -0.010 -0.192 0.012 0.235 0.026 0.529 
 
(0.323) (0.317) (0.386) (0.375) (0.597) (0.579) 
High Headquarter Concentration   0.040*** 0.824*** 
  
 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
  High Campaign Concentration   -0.034** -0.721*** 
  
 
  (0.010) (0.006) 
  Treat * High Headquarter    0.037*** 0.785*** 
  
 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
  Post * High Headquarter    -0.044*** -0.918*** 
  
 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
  Treat * Post * High Headquarter      0.012 0.240 
 
    (0.231) (0.215) 
Treat * High Campaign      -0.002 -0.052 
 
    (0.933) (0.911) 
Post * High Campaign      0.039** 0.832*** 
 
    (0.012) (0.007) 
Treat * Post * High Campaign      -0.046* -0.973* 
 
    (0.093) (0.074) 
Log (Total Assets) 0.003** 0.070** 0.003* 0.062* 0.005* 0.107* 
 
(0.034) (0.030) (0.064) (0.056) (0.099) (0.089) 
Leverage 0.008 0.170 0.010 0.200 0.019 0.372 
 
(0.634) (0.627) (0.575) (0.566) (0.520) (0.521) 
Return-on-Assets -0.008 -0.191 -0.005 -0.109 0.0001 -0.0507 
 
(0.616) (0.568) (0.790) (0.744) (0.996) (0.932) 
Intangible Ratio 0.0003 0.006 0.0003 0.005 0.009 0.193 
 
(0.626) (0.624) (0.635) (0.635) (0.910) (0.904) 
R&D-to-Sales 0.0002 0.001 -0.0003 -0.009 -0.001 -0.025 
 
(0.851) (0.960) (0.824) (0.694) (0.645) (0.519) 
Constant -0.026 -0.506 -0.0207 -0.435 -0.022 -0.443 
 
(0.729) (0.729) (0.778) (0.765) (0.825) (0.824) 
 
    
  State, Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.054 0.071 0.071 0.104 0.104 
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table X show that the coefficient of Treatment * Post is negatively 
(though not statistically significantly) related to the likelihood and size of subsidy awards. In 
columns 3 through 6, I implement the DiDiD approach and observe that treatment firms giving 
politically in a concentrated manner observe significant declines in the likelihood and size of 
subsidy awards. The coefficients on the variables of interest are negative (-0.044, -0.918, -0.046, 
-0.973, respectively) and significant (p-values <0.001, <0.001, 0.093, 0.074, respectively). The 
decline in likelihood and size of subsidies for concentrated treatment firms following reforms, as 
well as the positive relation between political giving and subsidies, provides causal inference for 
the channel through which firms benefit from participating in the political process. 
Additional Analysis of Political Giving and Shareholder Wealth 
To offer additional evidence on the robustness of a causal relation between political 
giving and shareholder wealth, I use an alternative research design: shock based IV approach 
(Bowen et al. 2014). Since exogenous shocks often provide useful instruments, I also employ an 
IV approach by following a growing strand of the finance literature (Adams & Santos 2006; 
Black et al. 2006; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Guner et al. 2008; Iliev 2010). Consistent with my 
prior results, I relate political giving to the reform period and observe a negative relation in 
untabulated results. I also analyze the relation between the predicted variation in political giving 
and shareholder wealth in order to capture the exogenous change in political giving following 
campaign finance reform. In this setting, law changes meet the necessary instrument validity 
requirements by offering a significant effect on political giving, being largely randomly assigned 
and only impacting shareholder wealth through political giving (Angrist & Pischke 2008). I 
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observe a negative relation between Post and political giving, as well as a positive relation 
between the fitted value of political giving and shareholder wealth. 
One concern with my research approach is that reforms need to be exogenous events. 
While campaign finance reforms have been used as exogenous shocks to elections in the political 
science literature, a possible concern is whether reforms are exogenous to firms, especially those 
giving politically. In untabulated analyses, I examine this by performing Weibull hazard models, 
where the “failure events" are the adoption of a political giving limit reduction. I find that 
reforms are not significantly related to information about the political economy, including the 
number or size of firms in the state, income per capita and political giving by firms overall or to 
either political party. I find no evidence that firms or states allocating a disproportionate share of 
giving to any particular party is a significant predictor of reforms, despite the fact that reforms 
are commonly associated with progressive politicians (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006). My 
results suggest firms giving politically have little discretion over reforms, indicating campaign 
finance reforms are exogenous to the treatment firms of my quasi-natural experiment. Further, 
reforms are difficult for firms to predict and respond to in advance, suggesting they are also 
unexpected shocks. Therefore, the exogenous shocks provided by campaign finance reforms 
offer the most direct basis for causal inference to date for the effect of political giving on 
shareholder wealth. 
To address other concerns that the states where the laws take place may differ from other 
states, I perform additional untabulated analyses. While state fixed effects likely take into 
account many unobservable factors, I perform additional analysis using a matched set of control 
firms within the reform states. I perform analysis with only in-state control firms, as well as 
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adding these control firms to my prior methodology. Further, I perform analyses where I pool all 
firms to include all possible firms to control for any potential difference in groups of firms or 
states. My results are similar in all cases, and the main conclusions remain unchanged. The 
results are also similar when analyzing differences between treatment and control firms rather 
than taking the differences from the average levels of each. I also perform analyses where I 
require that the firms only give to politicians within the reform state. While the sample is limited, 
the results are qualitatively similar. I also find similar results when using propensity score 
matching to identify control firms. Due to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, I also 
perform subsample analyses before 2010 and observe similar results. Unfortunately, between the 
BCRA of 2002 and 2010 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case between 
Citizens United and the FEC, no state campaign finance reforms were enacted, largely due to 
states waiting on the court system to process the federal reforms. Additionally, due to the unique 
nature of the state-level data, I am able to observe whether political giving was allocated to 
winning campaigns. As a result, I perform analysis focused specifically on these funds and 
observe similar results on the subset of firms allocating capital to politicians winning elections. 
Finally, while the number of reforms removing restrictions on political giving limits is 
small, I perform additional robustness tests on these law changes. In a couple of instances, states 
enact campaign finance reforms limiting political giving and subsequently pass laws removing 
those restrictions. In those cases, firms forced to reduce political giving exhibit positive changes 
in shareholder wealth following the removal of the restrictions providing further support for 
political giving increasing shareholder wealth and suggesting campaign finance reform can 
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Several studies on corporate involvement in politics have associated positive shareholder 
wealth effects with political influence. In fact, the return on investment suggested by some 
studies implies that corporations are significantly underinvesting in political influence. However, 
a causal link between corporate outcomes and participation in the political process is unclear. I 
provide the most comprehensive study of corporate political giving and shareholder wealth to 
date by introducing an innovative dataset, which allows me to exploit the staggered adoption of 
U.S. state laws to examine the effect of corporate political giving on shareholder wealth largely 
free of econometric concerns related to reverse causality, omitted variables, simultaneity bias, 
heterogeneous effects or measurement and other specification errors.  
The empirical evidence indicates firms giving politically benefit from greater shareholder 
wealth, and one channel for increased wealth is in the form of additional government awarded 
subsidy contracts. I observe shareholder wealth declines following exogenous reductions in 
political giving resulting from campaign finance reforms, relative to otherwise similar but 
unaffected control firms. Importantly, the results show treatment firms reduce political giving 
and only firms reducing political giving exhibit negative changes to shareholder wealth. My 
empirical evidence helps measure firm benefits from political ties, suggesting the economic 
magnitude is noteworthy. Additionally, the results suggest corporate political givers are 
benefiting from their particular giving strategy and that reforms can force firms to alter political 
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participation to the detriment of shareholders. Overall, my results document shareholder benefits 
from corporate engagement in politics. 
My study contributes to the literature on political links by informing the campaign 
finance landscape and providing the most credible basis for causal inference to date. I also 
contribute to the literature developing in financial economics that employs exogenous shocks to 
offer further scrutiny to econometric concerns. My findings suggest campaign finance reform 
plays an important role for corporate participants. The empirical evidence also informs the 
debate around campaign finance reforms, showing restrictions can negatively impact firms 
headquartered within the reform state and their shareholders. Policy makers should consider 
what value, if any, is created from restricting corporate participation in the political process and 
whether it exceeds the value destroyed. Public policy makers should be thoughtful of the 
structures of reforms, which are critical in determining which firms are most likely to be 
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Table A.I Summary of Campaign Finance Reform 
 
State Political Giving Limit Law Change Year of Laws Passed 
Alabama  Always Unlimited 
 Alaska  Always Limited 
 Arizona  Always Limited 
 Arkansas  Becomes Unlimited 1998 
California  Becomes Limited Then Unlimited 1996; 1998 
Colorado  Becomes Unlimited 1998 
Connecticut  Always Limited 
 Delaware  Always Limited 
 Florida  Always Limited 
 Georgia  Becomes Limited 1998 
Hawaii  Always Limited 
 Idaho  Becomes Limited 1998 
Illinois Becomes Limited 2011 
Indiana  Always Unlimited 
 Iowa  Always Unlimited 
 Kansas  Always Limited 
 Kentucky  Becomes Limited 1988 
Louisiana  Becomes Limited 1988 
Maine  Always Limited 
 Maryland  Becomes Limited 1992 
Massachusetts  Becomes Limited 1994 
Michigan  Always Limited 
 Minnesota  Always Limited 
 Mississippi  Always Limited 
 Missouri  Becomes Limited Then Unlimited 1996; 2000 
Montana Always Limited 
 Nebraska  Always Limited 
 Nevada  Becomes Limited 1992 
New Hampshire  Becomes Unlimited Then Limited 1986; 2000 
New Jersey  Always Limited 
 New Mexico  Becomes Limited 2010 
New York  Becomes Limited 1994 
North Carolina  Always Limited 
 North Dakota Always Unlimited 




Table A.I Summary of Campaign Finance Reform (Continued) 
 
State Political Giving Limit Law Change Year of Laws Passed 
Oklahoma Always Limited 
 Oregon Becomes Limited Then Unlimited 1996; 1998 
Pennsylvania Always Limited 
 Rhode Island Becomes Limited 1990 
South Carolina Becomes Limited 1992 
South Dakota Always Limited 
 Tennessee Becomes Limited 1996 
Texas Always Unlimited 
 Utah Always Unlimited 
 Vermont Becomes Unlimited 2004 
Virginia Always Unlimited 
 Washington Becomes Limited 1994 
West Virginia Always Limited 
 Wisconsin Always Limited 






Table A.II Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Measurement Data Source 
Board Insiders A count of the board of directors at the firm 
employed by the firm at the most recent 
annual meeting prior to the election cycle 
end 
RiskMetrics 
Board Size A count of the board of directors at the firm 
at the most recent annual meeting prior to the 
election cycle end 
RiskMetrics 
Book-to-Market The ratio of book value of equity at the most 
recent fiscal year end prior to the election 
cycle end to market value of equity at the 
month prior to the fiscal year end  
Compustat Annual 
Business Segments The count of business segments the firm has 
listed in Compustat during the most recent 
fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end 
Compustat Annual 
Federal Political Giving The sum of federal political giving made by 
a given firm over the prior four year election 
cycle 
Federal Election Commission 
Federal  Binary equal to one where the firm gives 
politically to federal political campaigns and 
zero otherwise 
Federal Election Commission 
Geographic Segments The count of geographic segments the firm 
has listed in Compustat during the most 
recent fiscal year end prior to the election 
cycle end 
Compustat Annual 
Governance Index A measure of firm governance based upon 
provisions the firm holds at the most recent 
annual meeting date prior to the election 
cycle end, reported by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003), with higher numbers 
indicating less shareholder-friendly 





Binary equal to one where the firm allocates 
more capital to the firm’s headquarter state 
than the median treatment firm over the prior 
four year election cycle and zero otherwise 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics, Compustat Annual 
High Campaign 
Concentration 
Binary equal to one where the firm allocates 
more capital to the campaign where the firm 
gives the most than the median treatment 
firm over the prior four year election cycle 
and zero otherwise 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics, Compustat Annual 
Headquarter State (%) The percentage of the firm’s total political 
giving allocated to campaigns for 
government offices in the state where the 
firm is headquartered during the election 
cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics, Compustat Annual 
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Table A.II Variable Definitions (Continued) 
 
Variable Measurement Data Source 
Incumbent (%) The percentage of the firm’s total political 
giving allocated to incumbent candidate 
campaigns during the election cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics, Compustat Annual 
Industry Adjusted Q The ratio of total assets less book value of 
equity plus market value of equity at the 
month prior to the fiscal year end to total 
assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior 
to the election cycle end, less the median for 
the industry as defined by the first two digits 
of Standard Industrial Classification Code 
Compustat Annual 
Intangible Ratio The ratio of intangible assets to total assets at 
the most recent fiscal year end prior to the 
election cycle end 
Compustat Annual 
Inverse Mills Ratio The ratio of the probability density function 
to the cumulative distribution function of a 
distribution computed from a probit model 
predicting the likelihood of a firm to give 
politically using firm size, sales, number of 
employees, business segments, geographic 
segments, book-to-market ratio, leverage, 
cash flow, industry market share, Herfindahl 
sales concentration index, regulated industry 
indicator, number of firms in industry with 
political action committee and industry 
government contracts relative to sales 
CRSP, Compustat Annual, 
United States Treasury Bureau 
of the Fiscal Service  
Leverage The ratio of long-term debt to assets at the 
most recent fiscal year end prior to the 
election cycle end 
Compustat Annual 
Log (Federal Giving) The log transformation of one plus the sum 
of a firm’s political giving to campaigns for 
federal office in all states over the prior four 
year election cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics 
Log (Political Giving) The log transformation of one plus the sum 
of a firm’s political giving to campaigns for 
office in all states over the prior four year 
election cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics 
Log (Subsidy) The log transformation of one plus the value 
of government subsidies received by the firm 
from state and local governments during the 
current year 
Good Jobs First National Policy 
Resource Center Subsidy 
Tracker Database 
Log (State Giving) The log transformation of one plus the sum 
of a firm’s state political giving to campaigns 
for office in all states over the prior four year 
election cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics 
Log (State Giving) * 
Federal 
The sum of a firm’s state political giving to 
campaigns for office in all states over the 
prior four year election cycle if the firm also 
gave to federal campaigns and zero otherwise 
National Institute on Money in 




Table A.II Variable Definitions (Continued) 
 
Variable Measurement Data Source 
Log (Total Assets) The log of one plus the total level of assets of 
the firm in millions of USD at the most 
recent fiscal year end prior to the election 
cycle 
Compustat Annual 
 Market  The cumulative return over the twelve 
months prior to the election cycle end 
CRSP 
Market Capitalization The total level of market capitalization of the 
firm in millions of USD at the most recent 
fiscal year end prior to the election cycle, 
using the price at the most recent month 
ending prior to the fiscal year end 
CRSP, Compustat Annual 
Maximum Political 
Giving Per Headquarter 
State Campaign  
The maximum of all state political giving 
allocated to campaigns for office in the 
firm’s headquarter state over the prior four 
year election cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics 
Momentum  The cumulative market-adjusted return over 
the twelve months prior to the election cycle 
end 
CRSP 
Political Giving Per 
Campaign 
The ratio of total political giving to the total 
number of campaigns to which the firm gave 
politically during the election cycle  
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics, Federal Election 
Commission 
Post  Time period indicator equal to one for the 
periods following campaign finance reform 
in headquarter state of the treatment firm and 
zero otherwise  
National Conference of State 
Legislatures; Stratmann and 
Aparicio-Castillo (2006); 
Christianson et al. (1996); 
Malbin and Gais (1998); 
Campaign Finance Law 
Treatment * Post State and time period indicator equal to one 
for firms previously giving politically above 
the subsequently imposed limit and 
headquartered in states reducing political 
giving limits for the periods following the 
law change and zero otherwise 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures; Stratmann and 
Aparicio-Castillo (2006); 
Christianson et al. (1996); 
Malbin and Gais (1998); 
Campaign Finance Law 
Post 12-Month Buy-and-
Hold Abnormal Return  
The cumulative market-adjusted return over 
the twelve months following the election 
cycle end  
CRSP 
Post 12-Month Buy-and-
Hold Return  
The cumulative return over the twelve 





The cumulative market-adjusted return over 






The cumulative market-adjusted return over 
the twelve months prior to the election cycle 
end  
CRSP 
R&D-to-Sales The ratio of research and development 
expenses to sales at the most recent fiscal 




Table A.II Variable Definitions (Continued) 
 
Variable Measurement Data Source 
Republican (%) The ratio of political giving to republican 
campaigns to total political giving over the 
prior four year election cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics 
Return-on-Assets The ratio of net income to total assets at the 
most recent fiscal year end prior to the 
election cycle end 
Compustat Annual 
Size The log of one plus the total level of market 
capitalization of the firm in millions of USD 
at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the 
election cycle, using the price at the most 
recent month ending prior to the fiscal year 
end 
CRSP, Compustat Annual 
State Giving The sum of a firm’s state political giving to 
campaigns for office in all states over the 
prior four year election cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics 
State Political Binary equal to one where the firm gives 
politically to state but not federal political 
campaigns and zero otherwise 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics 
Subsidy  Binary equal to one if the firm receives a 
government subsidy from state and local 
governments during the current year 
Good Jobs First National Policy 
Resource Center Subsidy 
Tracker Database 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of total assets less book value of 
equity plus market value of equity at the 
month prior to the fiscal year end to total 
assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior 
to the election cycle end 
Compustat Annual 
Total Headquarter State 
Political Giving 
The firm’s total state political giving 
allocated to campaigns for government 
offices in the state where the firm is 
headquartered during the election cycle 
National Institute on Money in 
State Politics, Compustat Annual 
Treatment State indicator equal to one for firms 
previously giving politically above the 
subsequently imposed limit and 
headquartered in states reducing political 
giving limits and zero otherwise 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures; Stratmann and 
Aparicio-Castillo (2006); 
Christianson et al. (1996); 
Malbin and Gais (1998); 
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